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19 result(s)
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1.
R. v. Keegstra - [1990] 3 SCR 697 - 1990-12-13
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Government sponsored hatred on group grounds would violate section 15 of the Charter. Parliament promotes equality and moves against inequality when it prohibits the wilful public promotion of group hatred on these grounds. [...] Those supporting s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code point to the fact that it applies only to wilful promotion of hatred, and not to promotion of any lesser emotion. Hatred, they argue, is the most extreme and reprehensible of human emotions. [...] But "hatred" does not stand alone. To convict, it must have been "wilfully promote[d]".
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2.
R. v. Andrews - [1990] 3 SCR 870 - 1990-12-13
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
The accused were charged with the wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code . [...] The wilful promotion of hatred even more than the spreading of false news is entirely antithetical to our very system of freedom. [...] The appellants were convicted of the offence of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group (s. 319(2) of the Code).
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3.
R. v. Krymowski - 2005 SCC 7 - [2005] 1 SCR 101 - 2005-02-24
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
Criminal law — Hate propaganda — Wilful promotion of hatred — Whether Crown failed to prove that wilful promotion of hatred was against “Roma” as particularized in information — Whether trial judge ought to have taken judicial notice of dictionary definitions demonstrating relationship between gypsies and Roma — Criminal [...] The gist of the offence under s. 319(2) is the wilful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group. In this case, the Crown particularized the group as “Roma”. [...] 13 The gist of the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code is the wilful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group. The provision reads as follows:
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4.
R. v. Zundel - [1992] 2 SCR 731 - 1992-08-27
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
Section 181 catches not only deliberate falsehoods which promote hatred, but sanctions all false assertions which the prosecutor believes `likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest', regardless of whether they promote the values underlying s. 2(b). [...] It is enough that those who publicly and wilfully promote hatred convey or attempt to convey a meaning . . . . Similarly, constitutional protection under s. 2(b) must therefore be extended to the deliberate publication of statements known to be false which convey meaning in a non-violent form. [...] There is very little chance that statements intended to promote hatred against an identifiable group are true, or that their vision of society will lead to a better world.
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5.
Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) - 2005 SCC 40 - [2005] 2 SCR 100 - 2005-06-28
Supreme Court JudgmentsAdministrative law
Criminal law
Immigration
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of [an offence]. [...] (2), an offence is committed only by wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group through the communication of statements other than in private conversation. [...] (1) is something less than intentional promotion of hatred. On the other hand, the use of the word “wilfully” in subs.
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6.
Canada (human Rights Commission) v. Taylor - [1990] 3 SCR 892 - 1990-12-13
Supreme Court JudgmentsAdministrative law
Constitutional law
that it must yield to reasonable measures prohibiting the promotion of hatred and discrimination against groups. On this approach, no conflict between freedom of expression and the limiting legislation arises; freedom of expression is readily cut back to accommodate laws against the promotion of hatred and discrimination. [...] The most significant is the means by which the promotion of hatred is to be curbed. In Keegstra and Andrews, the method at issue was the criminalization of wilful attempts to promote hatred against groups. [...] vague, emotive terms without definition, the state necessarily incurs the risk of catching within the ambit of the regulated area expression falling short of hatred. The breadth of the section is further widened by the absence of any requirement of intent or foreseeability of the actual promotion of hatred or contempt.
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7.
R. v. Keegstra - [1995] 2 SCR 381 - 1995-05-18
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
K was found guilty of wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code . [...] L.R. (3d) 4, 157 A.R. 1, 77 W.A.C. 1, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 505, allowing the accused's appeal from his conviction for wilful promotion of hatred and ordering a new trial. Motion to quash dismissed. [...] (2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
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8.
R. v. Hamilton - 2005 SCC 47 - [2005] 2 SCR 432 - 2005-07-29
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
In that case, the constitutional validity of s. 319(2), which prohibits communications that wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group, was challenged on the basis that it unduly restricted the freedom of expression under s. 2( b ) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . [...] The Court adopted a stringent standard, noting that the limitation on the mens rea required to convict for “wilfully promoting hatred” was a key factor in minimizing the impairment of freedom of expression caused by that provision. [...] Dickson C.J. noted that the requirement that the speaker subjectively intend that his speech promote hatred “significantly restricts the reach of the provision, and thereby reduces the scope of the targeted expression” (p. 775).
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9.
R. v. Lucas - [1998] 1 SCR 439 - 1998-04-02
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
The protection of an individual’s reputation from wilful and false attack recognizes both the innate dignity of the individual and the integral link between reputation and the fruitful participation of an individual in Canadian society. [...] I cannot think of a more rational way to protect the reputation of individuals from wilful and false attack than the creation of the aggravated offence crafted by the committee. [...] In addressing the value to be given to a communication intended to promote hatred against identifiable groups, Dickson C.J. stated, at p. 765:
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10.
Hansman v. Neufeld - 2023 SCC 14 - 2023-05-19
Supreme Court JudgmentsCourts
At trial, H need not demonstrate that N is bigoted, transphobic, or promoted hatred, as the question is merely whether the statement can be tethered to an adequate factual basis so the reader can be an informed judge. [...] [113] Additionally, Mr. Neufeld contends that because the Criminal Code recognizes an offence of wilful promotion of hatred (see s. 319(2)), the allegation that he “tip toed . . . into hate speech” would be taken as imputing criminal liability. [...] [152] Read plainly and in the context of the press release, this statement implies that Mr. Neufeld promoted hatred against an identifiable group, i.e. LGBTQ students. [153] Then, in April 2018, a news article was published on CityNews 1130’s website.
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11.
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) - [1998] 1 SCR 877 - 1998-05-29
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
The salutary effect of s. 322.1 is to promote the right of voters not to be misled in the exercise of their right to vote. [...] 60 The salutary effect of s. 322.1 is to promote the right of voters not to be misled in the exercise of their right to vote. [...] These considerations undermine the notion that we can draw a bright line between provisions which are justifiable because they require proof that hatred actually resulted, and provisions which are unjustifiable because they require only an intent to promote hatred.
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12.
Ward v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) - 2021 SCC 43 - [2021] 3 SCR 176 - 2021-10-29
Supreme Court Judgments(a) to promote recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family; and [...] The complainants, who had received the flyers at their homes, argued that the material promoted hatred against individuals because of their sexual orientation — a prohibited ground recognized by the Saskatchewan statute. [...] Expression that stirs up extreme and intrinsically dangerous emotions like hatred in an audience clearly does not have the same impact as expression that is calm and rational.
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13.
Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. - [1995] 2 SCR 1031 - 1995-07-20
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
In R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, for instance, the defences established in s. 319(3) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , to prosecutions for "wilfully promoting hatred" under s. 319(2) provided considerable assistance in interpreting the ambit of the offence in s. 319(2). [...] [The s. 319(3)] defences are ... intended to aid in making the scope of the wilful promotion of hatred more explicit; individuals engaging in the type of expression described [in s. 319(3)] are thus given a strong signal that their activity will not be swept into the ambit of the offence. [...] 53 Moreover, the precise codification of environmental hazards in environmental protection legislation may hinder, rather than promote, public understanding of what conduct is prohibited, and may fuel uncertainty about the "area of risk" created by the legislation.
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14.
R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer - 2001 SCC 42 - [2001] 2 SCR 344 - 2001-06-29
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
139. (1) Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice in a judicial proceeding, [...] (3) Without restricting the generality of subsection (2), every one shall be deemed wilfully to attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice who in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, [...] 50 The first reason supporting the need for secrecy is that confidentiality promotes candour and the kind of full and frank debate that is essential to this type of collegial decision making.
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15.
R. v. Sharpe - 2001 SCC 2 - [2001] 1 SCR 45 - 2001-01-26
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
For example, in Keegstra, supra, the impugned legislation prohibited the willful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group. Dickson C.J. found that s. 15 and s. 27 of the Charter were relevant to determining the importance of the government’s objective of eradicating hate propaganda. [...] Government sponsored hatred on group grounds would violate section 15 of the Charter . Parliament promotes equality and moves against inequality when it prohibits the wilful public promotion of group hatred on these grounds. [...] It is legislation which promotes respect for the inherent dignity of children by curbing the existence of materials which degrade them.
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16.
R. v. Chartrand - [1994] 2 SCR 864 - 1994-07-14
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
In R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.), although in the context of wilful promotion of hatred, Martin J.A. stated at pp. 384-85: I agree ... that, as a general rule, a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially certain to result from an act which he does in order to
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17.
R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society - [1992] 2 SCR 606 - 1992-07-09
Supreme Court JudgmentsAppeal
Competition law
Constitutional law
It had been argued that s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , was too broad in its ambit ("wilfully promot[ing] hatred against any identifiable group"), and could include expression that bears no relationship with Parliament's objective in enacting the statute. [...] . . . Mens rea focuses on the mental state of the accused and requires proof of a positive state of mind such as intent, recklessness or wilful blindness. Negligence, on the other hand, measures the conduct of the accused on the basis of an objective standard, irrespective of the accused's subjective mental state.
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18.
R. v. Friesen - 2020 SCC 9 - [2020] 1 SCR 424 - 2020-04-02
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
In order to promote the uniform application of the law of sentencing, the following non‐exhaustive significant factors to determine a fit sentence for sexual offences against children must be considered. [...] In assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender, courts must take into account the harm the offender intended or was reckless or wilfully blind to (Arcand, at para. 58; see also M. (C.A.), at para. 80; Morrisey, at para. 48). [...] Instead, our aim is to provide guidance on specific factors that require “the articulation of governing and intelligible principles” to promote the uniform application of the law of sentencing (Gardiner, at pp. 397 and 405).
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19.
R. v. Finta - [1994] 1 SCR 701 - 1994-03-24
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
The normal mens rea for confinement, robbery, manslaughter, or kidnapping, whether it be intention, knowledge, recklessness or wilful blindness, would be adequate. As Egon Schwelb notes in "Crimes Against Humanity" (1946), 23 Brit. [...] On April 5, 1942, he was promoted to the rank of captain. He was transferred to Szeged as the commander of an investigative unit of the Gendarmerie. [...] The essential quality of a war crime or a crime against humanity is that the accused must be aware of or wilfully blind to the fact that he or she is inflicting untold misery on his victims.