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R. v. Brown, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 749

 

Her Majesty The Queen                                                                   Appellant

 

v.

 

Brent Blair Brown                                                                              Respondent

 

and

 

The Attorney General of Canada,

the Attorney General for Ontario,

the Attorney General of Quebec and

the Attorney General of British Columbia                                       Interveners

 

Indexed as:  R. v. Brown

 

File No.:  23479.

 

1994:  November 2.

 


Present:  Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.

 

on appeal from the court of appeal for manitoba

 

                   Constitutional law ‑‑ Charter of Rights  ‑‑ Cruel and unusual punishment ‑‑ Criminal law ‑‑ Sentencing ‑‑ Mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm while committing indictable offence -- Sentence to be served consecutively to punishment imposed for an offence arising from same event ‑‑ Sentence imposed on conviction for armed robberies using shotgun ‑‑ Whether provision creating minimum sentence infringing s. 12  of Charter  ‑‑ If so, whether justified under s. 1  of Charter  ‑‑ Whether provision requiring sentence to be served consecutively if arising out of same event infringing s. 12  of Charter  ‑‑ If so, whether justified under s. 1  of Charter  ‑‑ Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 12  ‑‑ Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C‑46, s. 85(1) , (2) .

 

                   Criminal law ‑‑ Sentencing ‑‑ Mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm while committing indictable offence to be served consecutively -- Sentence to be served consecutively to punishment imposed for an offence arising from same event ‑‑ Sentence imposed on conviction for armed robberies using shotgun ‑‑ Whether provision creating minimum sentence infringing s. 12  of Charter  ‑‑ If so, whether justified under s. 1  of Charter  ‑‑ Whether provision requiring sentence to be served consecutively if arising out of same event infringing s. 12  of Charter  ‑‑ If so, whether justified under s. 1  of Charter .

 

Cases Cited

 

                   AppliedR. v. Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485.

 

Statutes and Regulations Cited

 

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , s. 12 .

 

Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C‑46 , s. 85 .

 

                   APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal (1993), 83 Man. R. (2d) 216, 36 W.A.C. 216, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 275, 19 C.R. (4th) 140, dismissing an appeal against conviction and allowing in part an appeal against sentence following conviction by Barkman J.  Appeal allowed and cross‑appeal dismissed.

 

                   Marva J. Smith, for the appellant, respondent by cross‑appeal.

 

                   Bruce F. Bonney, for the respondent, appellant by cross‑appeal.

 

                   Kimberley Prost and Erin McDey, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.

 

                   Eric H. Sibenmorgen, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario.

 

                   Daniel Grégoire and  Jacques Gauvin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.

 

                   No one appearing for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia (written submission only).

 

                   The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by

 

                   Iacobucci J. ‑‑ At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of s. 85  of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C‑46 .  We are all of the view that the appeal should be allowed on the basis of the principles recently decided by the Court in R. v. Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485.  In Goltz, the majority of the Court held that a two‑stage test should be employed to evaluate the constitutionality of a legislative sentencing provision under s. 12  of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .  The first stage is to view the provision in question from the perspective of the accused, and on the facts of this case, which involved three armed robberies using a shotgun, the provision clearly does not offend s. 12.

 

                   The second stage involves considering reasonable hypotheticals involving the offence underlying the sentence in the case before the court.  Here, the Attorney General of Manitoba limited its defence of s. 85 to the case which concerns armed robbery as the underlying offence.  As such, the hypothetical proposed by the respondent relating to mischief is not a reasonable hypothetical envisioned by Goltz.  We agree with these submissions and would therefore find no violation of s. 12  of the Charter .

 

                   Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Manitoba is set aside, the cross‑appeal is dismissed, and the trial judge's calculation of the respondent's sentence is restored.

 

                   We would answer the constitutional questions as follows:

 

Questions 1 and 3:  No, when the underlying offence is robbery.  The operation of s. 85 in conjunction with other potential underlying indictable offences is not at issue in this appeal and no answer is required regarding the validity of s. 85 in conjunction with such other offences.

 

Questions 2 and 4:  These questions do not arise.

 

 

                   Appeal allowed and cross‑appeal dismissed.  The first and third constitutional questions should be answered in the negative; the second and fourth did not arise.

 

                   Solicitor for the appellant, respondent by cross‑appeal:  The Attorney General of Manitoba, Winnipeg.

 

                   Solicitors for the respondent, appellant by cross‑appeal:  Nozick, Sinder & Associates, Winnipeg.

 

                   Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada:  John C. Tait, Ottawa.

 

                   Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario:  The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto.

 

                   Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec:  The Attorney General of Quebec, Ste‑Foy.

 

                   Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia:  The Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.

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