Supreme Court Judgments

Supreme Court of Canada

Pilon v. Brunet, (1879) 5 SCR 318

Date: 1879-03-13

DAME ADELAIDE PILON et al

Appellant;

And

DAME ALBINA MALETTE ESQUALITÉ AND EMERY BRUNET ET UX. ESQUALITÉ

Respondent.

1879: Nov 4; 1880: March 13

PRESENT,—Ritchie, C. J., and Fournier, Henry. Taschereau and Gwynne, J. J.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

Assets of first and second community—Transfer of arrears of lije. rent by wife to the grandson of her second husband, validity of—— Edit de secondes noces 1560 Arts 279 282 and 283 Custom of Paris and Arts. 1760, 1265 and 774 C. C. (P. Q.) Costs—Error of date in deed of transfer.

On the 17th February. 1841, C. and wife acknowledged by the deed that they were indebted to one 8. N., widow of one P.. in a sum of $140, due to her late husband. On the same day C. and wife, the son-in-law and daughter of S. N. and P., also acknowledged to be indebted to S. N.. in an annual life-rent, in

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consideration of certain real estate given to them previously by the late P. and S. N., by deed of gift, 16th February, 1830. On 19th February, 1841, the widow, S. N., married one J. B. L. On the 21st January, 1870, J. B. L. and his wife, S. N., transferred to P. L., the grandson of J. B. L.., all the arrears of life-rent due them by C. and his wife as well as the sum of $140, being the amount of the obligation.

On an action brought by P. L. against C. and wife, to recover £1,325 for 26 years of said life-rent, and £35 for the amount of the obligation of the 17th February, 1841 ;

Held,—1. Affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side), that the arrears of the life-rent which accrued during the second marriage of S.N. belonged to the community which existed between her and her second husband J. B. L.., and that the husband as head of the community could legally dispose of his share in the community, viz : one-half of said arrears, in favor of his grandson P. L.,but the transfer as to the other half belonging to his wife, S. N., was null, as by law S. N. could not transfer to any of her husband's descendants, who, in such a case are, by law, considered as persons interposed to secure directly to the husband a benefit which cannot be conferred to him directly -Art. 774 0. C. (P. Q.)

2. Reversing the judgment of the Court a quo. that although the sum of $140 formed part of the movables belonging to the first community, yet the half of said sum belonging to S. N. at the time of her second marriage formed part of the second community, and her husband, J. B. L., could legally dispose of his share in said sum, viz. : $35 in favor of his grandson, the transfer of the balance, viz.. $105, being null and void.

In this case both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, the respondent, A. M. et ux. having succeeded in getting the judgment of the Court a quo reversed on the second point and con-firmed on the first point, were allowed costs of a cross appeal.

In plaintiffs declaration it was alleged that the arrears of rent transferred to him and which he claimed from defendants were due in virtue of a liferent constituted by a deed of cession dated 16th February, 1828, and in the Superior Court, after argument, a motion was made by plaintiff to discharge the délibéré inasmuch as it was discovered at the argument that a clerical error of a serious nature to the interests of the present plaintiff had inadvertently crept into one of the authentic documents invoked by the plaintiff in support of his action, such error being as to the date of a certain donation upon

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which the action is mainly based ; arid inasmuch as such clerical error can most easily be remedied by referring to the minute of the notary who passed the deed or otherwise, this motion was . granted, and a second motion was made by the plaintiff en reprise d'instance, praying to be allowed to amend the declaration by adding under count No. 10 in the declaration the following to wit. i That the date of the constitution of the rent above mentioned was erroneously mentioned in the deed of transfer above related as being made by and in virtue of the contract of marriage of the said A. C., dated the 7th February, 1828.

"That the said constituted rent is made by a deed of the 16th February, 1830, as it appears from an authentic copy of said deed forming part of exhibit number one of the plaintiff in this cause, and that the intention of the parties to the' said deed of transfer at the time of the execution thereof was to transfer the arrears of rent constituted by the said defendant on the 16th February, 1830. The said rent being the only one due by the said A. G to the said S. N."

Held (affirming the judgment of the courts below), that the error in the transfer as to the date of the deed under which the life-rent was due, was a mere clerical error. There was no other liferent to which the transfer could apply but the one in question The claim was sufficiently identified by the description of the ' deeds and the date of their registration, under the special allegations of the plaintiff and the evidence which he has adduced.

Appeal from a judgment of the Court or Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side), reversing a judgment of the Superior Court for Lower Canada, by which the plaintiff, Pierre Lalonde, then represented by his widow Dame Albina Mallette, as tutrix to his two minor children had been condemned to pay to the respondent es-qualité the sum of $5,143.00 with interest and costs, the Court of Queen's Bench reducing the condemnation to $2,101.77 with costs of appeal against the respondent es-qualité.

The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, (Appeal side) Was appealed from to the Supreme Court by the present appellants on the ground that the condemnation was yet excessive. At the same time the respondent.

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es-qualité, appealed also from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal side), on the ground that the judgment of the Superior Court ought to have been affirmed This second appeal was treated by the Court as a cross-appeal under the Supreme Court rules.

The facts of the case as stated by Sir A. A. Dorion, C. J. of the Court below, are as follows :

On the 7th of February, 1828, Adélaïde Pilon, then a minor issue of the marriage of Joseph Pilon and Scholastique Neveu, married one Antoine Charlebois.

Joseph Pilon was a party to the contract of marriage and gave to the future consorts certain real estate of which he reserved for himself as well as for his wife the enjoyment (l'usufruit) as long as they lived.

On the 16th February 1830, Pilon and his wife made a transaction with Charlebois and his wife by which in consideration of an annual life-rent (rente viagère) payable in kind, they released the enjoyment (l'usufruit) which they had reserved by the first deed.

Pilon died in 1839 and his wife survived him

On the 17th of February, 1841, his widow, Scholaslique Neveu gave to Charlebois and his wife, a discharge, in full for all the arrears of this life-rent which were due to her up to the 17th of February 1841. The arrears have also been paid since for the year 1842, 1843 and 1844, as admitted in the plaintiff's declaration.

On the same day, 17th February, 1841, Charlebois  and wife acknowledged by a notarial obligation that they were indebted to Scholastique Neveu, widow Pilon, in a sum of 840 francs ancient currency, equal to $140, due for the amount of an obligation of the 18th of September, 1830, by Charlebois to the late Joseph Pilon.

Having thus settled her affairs with her daughter and her son-in-law, Scholastique Neveu married one Jean Baptiste Lacombe, on the 19th day of February following (1841).

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Lacombe was a widower and had a daughter by his first marriage. Her name was Marie Virginie Lacombe. She married Pierre Moise Lalonde, and had by this marriage a son whose name was Pierre Lalonde.

On the 21st of January 1870, Lacombe and his wife Scholastique Neveu, the mother of the appellant, transferred to this Pierre Lalonde, the grandson of Lacombe, all the arrears of life-rent which were due by Charlebois and his wife to Scholastique Neveu, from December, 1844, to December, 1869.

In the deed of transfer it is erroneously stated that the arrears of life-rent so transferred are due by virtue of the contract of marriage of Charlebois and his wife of the 7th February, 1828, and also by virtue of deed of transfer of the 16th February 1828 written at the foot of the said contract of marriage while this life-rent was created by an act of the 16th of February 1830 already mentioned, which act is how ever written at the foot of the original contract of marriage of the 7th of February, 1828.

Lacombe and wife also transferred by the same deed to Lalonde the 840 francs or $140 due by Charlebois and his wife by their obligation of the 17th of February, 1841.

On the 27th of March following (1870), a little over two months after the date of this transfer Scholastique Neveu died.

Shortly after her death, Pierre Lalonde brought the present action against Charlebois by which he has claimed:—

1st. For 26 years of life-rent transferred to him by Scholastique Neven under the above transfer.	£1,325 5 10
2nd. The amount of the obligation of the 17th of February, 1841, 840 francs equal to	35 0 0

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3rd. For the funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of Scholastique Neveu paid for by the defendant Charlebois and his wife	35 11 6
Making a total of	£1,394 0 4

Equal to $5,576066 with interest from the 28th of April, 1871, and costs.

To this demand the defendant Charlebois pleaded the facts already stated, and further, that the life-rent transferred by Scholastique Neveu to Lalonde represented to the extent of one-fifth the individual estate (les propres) of the said Scholastique Neveu and for four-fifths the properties acquired during the first community ; that no part of the four-fifths of his life-rent, which represented the properties acquired during the first community, could form part of the second community ; that Scholastique Neveu had no right during her marriage to give any of her property to her husband Lacombe, nor to his grandson Lalonde ; that the sum of 840 francs ancient currency was also a conquet of the first com-munity and that the transfer made to Lalonde was only valid as to one-tenth of the arrears of life-rent which was the share of Lacombe in one-fifth of such arrears which had fallen into the second community and Charleboi]s offered to confess judgment for $312 as the value of the share of arrears of said life-rent which Lacombe was entitled to transfer.

To this plea the plaintiff answered generally ; also that Scholastique Neveu had made a will by which she had disposed of all her properties in favor of her husband Lacombe, and that the defendant had therefore no interest in asking that the transfer of the 21st of February, 1870, be annulled.

On this contestation, the Superior Court holding that the transfer was not affected by the Edit des secondes

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noces and that Scholastique Neveu had the right to transfer her claims to Lalonde, as she had done condemned the defendant Charlebois to pay to the plaintiff a sum of $5,143.21 with interest from the 29th of April 1871, and costs. This sum of $5,143.21 is composed of $ 1,860.30 for the value of 26 years of arrears of life-rent, $140 amount of the obligation of the 17th of February, 1841 and $142900 paid for the defendant for the funeral expenses, etc., of Scholastique Neveu.

There was no dispute about this last claim of $142.90 which was admitted by the appellants.

The only other facts requiring to be noticed with reference to this appeal are, that Pierre Lalonde, the original plaintiff, died before judgment was rendered in the court below and that Antoine Charlebois, the original defendant, died since the judgment. They are now respectively represented in the cause, Charlebois by the appellants and Lalonde by the respondent.

As the pretended will of Scholastique Neveu invoked by the plaintiff in his answers to the defendant's plea the date of which is not even indicated, was never fyled, it was found unnecessary to examine whether or not it would have been a good answer to the defendant's pretensions had it been produced.

Mr Pagnuelo, Q. C., for appellants :

The first question that naturally comes up under the plea of general denial is whether the plaintiff as assignee under the deed of the 21st January, 1870, can claim any of the arrears of pension due by the defend-ant to Schoiastique Neveu.

The deed under which the pension was constituted was passed on the 16th Feb., 1830; this is the only deed under which a pension may be claimed from the defendant; but by the transfer of the 21st January 1870, Scholastique Neveu and J. B. Lacombe assigned

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over to the plaintiff the arrears of a pension which might be due to S. Neveu in virtue of the contract of marriage of the 7th February, 1828, between the defendant and A. Pilon, and under a deed of cession bearing date the 16th February, 1828, written at the end of the said contract of marriage.

No such pension exists, and plaintiff has failed to prove any title to the pension which he claims in this cause. The plaintiff felt it so much that after the case had been argued and taken en d délibéré," he moved that the "délibéré" be discharged in order that he might be allowed to amend his declaration. This motion was granted and the amendment allowed, hut illegally as the defendant submits: 1st. The motion was not stamped and this is fatal ([1]). 2nd. The amendment was allowed on payment of $60 costs, which have not been paid. 3rd. No. verbal evidence of the transferer's intentions could be adduced. The evidence of the notary, who is about the only witness brought up, and who throws the blame of what he calls an error on his clerk to whom be dictated the deed, is illegal as tending to prove against a written document and to contradict it.

Besides, no proof of the intent of the late donor, but suppositions only could be made, which are destroyed by the following circumstances : (a) The old lady never intended to claim this life-rent, which she had not claimed for 25 years ; (b) it was only on her death bed, aged 78 years, that she was beset by her husband's family to make her husband's grandson this transfer, which meant the total ruin of her only child. This error might have been a very clever mode of evading the obsessions she was beset with, without ruining her

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child. Suppositions will not be strained to help committing an injustice.

The following are in point to prove that the absence of date or a false date given in the enregistration of deeds is fatal, and carries with it the complete nullity of the enregistration :

Cass. (Ehrard) S. V. 12, 1, 182, id. Coll. nouv. 3, 1, 421, D. a, 9, 11 Nov. 1811 ; Bruxelles (Haumont) S. V. Coll. N. 3, 2, 509 Cass. (Lahaye) S. V. 7, 1, 234, 22 avril 1807 ; C. N. 2, 1, 1376 ; Cass. 19 juin 1833 (Bar-salon) S. V. 33, 1, 641. Dalloz, P. 33,1; Cass. 1 Mai 1860 (Rocker) S. V. 61, 1, 267 ; Merlin, Rep. vo. Insc. hyp, s. 5, No. 18, et vo. Hypothéque, sect. 2, s. 2, Art. 10 ; Grenier, t. 1, No. 97 ; Persil Rég. hyp. Art. 2148, s. 3, Nos. 1 et 2 ;Zacharie, t. 2, s. 276, No. 7, t. 3, sur No. 276, p. 344 and foll ; Solon, Des nullités, t. 1, No. 362 : " The false enunciation of the date of the instrument creating the debt is sufficient to make the inscription null ;" Cass. 7 Septembre 1807 (Lefèvre) S. V. 8,1, 92 ; Rouen, 8 février 1806 (Langlois) S. V. Coll. N. 2, 2 113 and others.

According to all these decisions and authorities the enregistration of the present transfer would be a complete nullity because the date of the deed creating the hypothec, to-wit, the deed constituting the pension of date 16th February, 1830, is not given in the transfer and would not appear in the registrar's books. If the date were in the transfer but not in the inscription, the inscription would be null. For the same reason the error being in the transfer itself, such transfer is null and void ; no debt is transferred, because the one which is mentioned does not exist and the one which exists is not mentioned.

How can a debt be sold which is not described ? Art. 1576 C. C., says :"The seller of a debt or other right is bound by law to the warranty that the debt

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exists and is due to him:

How could such a warranty exist when no debt is mentioned ? But here the debt mentioned does not exist and whether so declared on purpose or not matters not.

The plaintiff shows no title to claim from defendant the pension due in virtue of the deed of 16th February, 1830, and if he has any recourse against J. B. Lacombe or Dame S. Neveu let him exercise it.

A second preliminary point was invoked by the appellant, under the plea of general denial, viz. : that there is no proof that the transfer in favor of plaintiff has ever been enregistered ; no certificate of enregistration has been fyled ; a certificate of service of the transfer only has being fyled.

On the merits of the case we submit first that the transfer of the wife's share in the arrears of the life rent was void as made by a wife to her husband through an interposed person, being a benefit between husband and wife conferred during marriage by act inter vivos.

Marriage covenants, whether determined by the parties or settled by law, are irrevocable ([2]).

It is a public law ; the nullity is absolute ([3]).

Therefore a wife cannot give any of her own property to her husband, either directly or indirectly, nor relinquish any of her rights in the community property.

According to the old custom of Paris, man and wife could not benefit each other during marriage either by donation or will ([4]).

A provincial statute passed in 1801 has taken away the prohibition of conferring benefits by will, as it gives

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full power to bequeath, all or any property in favor of any person whatsoever. The Civil Code of Quebec maintains the prohibition as to Acts inter vivos only, but the plaintiff wants to have it said that the liberty of conferring benefits by last will implies the liberty of conferring benefits inter vivos and even has abolished all restrictions to marriage covenants, made, of course, before marriage, by persons marrying a second time and having children from a first marriage. But such a pretension is clearly untenable.

Art. 7T4, C. C;, defines who are interposed persons s it is the ascendants, the descendants, the presumptive heir at the time of the gift, and the consort of the per-son incapable, unless the presumption established by law be rebutted by services rendered or relations of kindred. There is no such pretension here, and the charge imposed is quite foreign to the wife, and only the discharge of a duty devolving upon the husband, J.. B. Lacombe, and the done.

It is objected that the arrears of the pension fell into the community of property existing between J. B. Lacombe and Scholastique Neveu ; that J. B. Lacombe, as head and master of the community, could dispose of the same absolutely, even in fraud of his wife's interest in them, saving the wife's recourse for indemnity upon the husband's property after the dissolution of the community ; that there was no fraud against the wife, as she was a party to the deed Of transfer; and finally that the defendant cannot oppose fraud as he is not heir to Scholastique Neveu.

We answer by saying, first, that the husband, as head of the community, may dispose of its property absolutely, provided it be, 1st, in favor of persons capable of receiving ; 2nd, without fraud ([5]). That supposing the arrear did fall in the community of J. B. Lacombe and

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Scholastique Neveu, which we do not admit, the donation by the husband of his wife's share to one of his descendants is a complete and absolute nullity ; is null and void, as contrary to a public law ; the donation by the wife, or her joining her husband in the donation to the husband's grand-child is also void as an indirect advantage to the husband. She might, after the dissolution of the community, claim indemnity on her husband's property if she chose, but she is at liberty, specially if the husband has divested himself of all his estate, to claim the things given, whether movable or immovable, from whomsoever is in possession of them, and the reimbursement of the sums of money so given and paid ([6]).

Adélaide Pilon was the only child and natural heir to her mother Scholastique Neveu, and was seized of all her mother's rights and estate by law without any act of apprehension ; it is sufficient if she does not renounce the succession, C. C. 607.

It was therefore sufficient to mention that Adélaide Pilon was the daughter of Scholastique Neveu, in order to establish that she was seized of the property, rights, and actions of Scholastique Neveu against the plaintiff. As she was in community of property with the nal defendant, Antoine Charlebois, the latter, as head of the community was also seized by her decease of said rights of Scholastique Neveu. Besides, it is not necessary that the child should be heir to his mother as he takes as child and not as heir the property acquired by his mother during her first community. Pothier, Contrat de mariage, No. 645.

A fourth question is : What portion of the life-rent

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fell into the community ? We say only one-fifth. The pension represented for four-fifths the joint acquets of the first community of property which had existed between Joseph Filon and Dame S. Neveu and S. Neveu could not dispose of any portion of the said first community's property in favor of he second husband, neither directly nor indirectly, under Art. 279 of the Custom of Paris. Any property coming to her through her first community was substituted to her children, issue of the first and second marriage by the event of her second marriage She could not dispose of it in favor of any one else. Pothier, Contrat de mariage, Nos. 630, 639.

Such property did not fall into her second com-munity, Id. No. 643;

It is objected that arrears of a life-rent are not a capital sum, but the fruits and revenues of a capital sum, and as such fall into the second community.

They may fall into a first community, but all movables which fall into an ordinary community do not fall into a second community, they do not when they have been acquired during the first community, art. 279 of the Coutume de Paris including movables as well as immovable’s in the property of the first community substituted in favor of the children, in the event of their mother marrying again.

Troplong, contrat de mariage, t.1, No. 68, 441 ; Pothier, communauté, No. 102 ; id contrat de mariage, 0.0. 1272, 882; Guyot, Rep. v. Noces, p. 164, 2nd col. in fine; Pothier, contrat de mariage, Nos. 631, 632, 643 ; Ferrière, Coutume de Paris, t.3, on art. 279, gloss 2, Nos. 31 and 9. '

Then there are three sorts of life-rent * some are given or bequeathed as aliments ; some are bought for a capital sum paid-up cash, and some are constituted as the price

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of sale of movable or immovable property. The life-rent in question here belongs to the last category.

When the life-rent is bequeathed as aliment or bought for a sum of money, the rent is the capital or thing given or bought ; the sum of money paid is the price of it. When it is constituted for the price of an immovable then the immovable is the thing sold and the life-rent is the price. The arrears of the life-rent are not considered in such a case as fruits or interest but as a capital sum.

Troplong, contrats alev., Nos. 216, 217, 218 ; Dalloz A. Cass, 86, 1, 4G9 ; Pothier, rente, Nos. 614, 615.

Four-fifths of the pension represented immovables belonging to the first community of property of Scholas-tique Neveu, and, as such, did not fall into the second community with J. B. Lacomb ([7]).

A fifth question regards the transfer of 840 francs ($140) by J. B. Lacombe and S. Neveu to the original plaintiff. We submit that the unanimous arrrêt of our Court of Queen's Bench which held such transfer void is correct under the second head of the Edict of Francois II. on second nuptials (made in 1560) ([8]). The first head enacts that a widow marrying again cannot settle on her second husband a greater portion of her own property than on her child least taking ; the second head forbids her settling on her second husband, or disposing in favor of any other party but the children of her first marriage, any property coming to her from the liberality of her first husband. Then comes art. 279 of the Custom of Paris, already cited substituting in favor of the wife's children any property acquired during the first community as community property ([9]).

That debt of 840 francs was due under an obligation

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passed in 1841 a few days before the second marriage, but was a debt due to the first community, being only a renewal of a former obligation passed in 1830, during the first marriage.

By law, Adelaide Pilon was owner of one-half of it as heir to her father, Joseph Pilon, and therefore it was not due to her mother If the latter did acquire it from her late husband say under his will (nothing shows how she did, and the obligation of 840 francs seems to have renewed for the whole under a misapprehension,) then it was a liberality of her first husband, and, as such, became her child's property from the moment of her second marriage, under the second head of the Edict. As to the other half belonging to S. Neveu, for her share in the community, it was a sum of money acquired during her first community, and also substituted to Adelaide Pilon her only child, under art. 279 of the Custom of Paris.

It is objected that all the restrictions imposed by the Edict and art. 279 of the Custom were abolished, first, by the statute of 1801, granting freedom of making wills ; and, in the second place, by art. 764 C. C.

To say that the withdrawal of one prohibition implies the withdrawal of all other restrictions is going too far.

Formerly a testator could make no dispositions in favor of his wife, and many other persons who were incapable of receiving under a will, nor under a donation inter vivos ; power was given by the statute of 1801 to every person to receive under a will, but the prohibitions as for donations inter vivos were not altered ([10]).

As for art. 764 C. C. it revoked all restrictions imposed on widows contracting marriages, but it stipulated only for future marriages. This is formally

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mentioned in s. 128, 29 Vic, c. 41 (1865), adopting the draft of the code.

No other interpretation can be given without giving the code a retroactive effect and destroying acquired rights. The only question raised by commentators has been whether we must consider the first or second marriage and most of them hold for the time of the first marriage because the law did then settle the rights of the children. But here both the first and second marriage took place long before the code was enacted.

The codifiers gave as the law in force in 1865 the dispositions of the edict on second nuptials and art. 279 of the custom, which they proposed to abrogate for the future, and for future marriages ; this suggestion was adopted by the legislature, and is now art. 764 of our Civil Code.

Mr. Laflamme, Q. C., for respondents :

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the preliminary points which were urged in the courts below by the defendants and which have been over-ruled by both Courts. It is sufficient to mention them with a few observations :

The party took advantage in the first court of clerical error which had occurred in the description of the deed constituting the life-rent, which had been mentioned as being due by virtue of the contract of marriage of the 7th February, 1828, instead of the donatinn of the 16th of February 1830. This error was rectified by an amendment of which the defendants acknowledged having received due notice, and conclusive evidence was adduced by the admission of defendant himself that the transfer was made of the life-rent in question, and both Courts unanimously held that it was a clerical error which could in no manner affect the plaintiff's title,

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Another objection was also raised, arising from the absence of registration of the transfer. This was not set up in the plea, but set forth only at the argument in appeal. The defendants invoked art. 1570 of the Code, in support of his pretension.

This article says that " the buyer of a right of action has no possession available against third parties, until signification of the act of sale, and a copy delivered to the debtor."

But the Art. 2127 establishes the penalty in consequence of such omission, in these words : "If these formalities be not observed, the conveyance or transfer is without effect against subsequent transferees who have conformed to the above requirements."

This provision of Art. 1570 has consequently no effect, except when there is a subsequent transfer made of the same claim but cannot be of any avail to the debtor when called upon to pay the amount transferred after due notification of the same as was made in this cause.

As these points have been formerly adjudicated upon by both Courts against the defendant, and are matters of form this Court would not for that reason alone reverse the judgment of the lower courts.

The respondent in this case, complaining that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench was erroneous, and contending that the judgment of the Superior Court ought to have been confirmed in every particular, also appealed from the judgment now on appeal before this Court, and, as the appeal taken by the respondents is to be treated by the Court as a cross appeal I will first urge the reasons why I believe the judgment of the Superior Court ought to have been maintained.

To maintain the correctness of the judgment of the Superior court and establish the error of the alterations made thereto by the judgment of the Court of Appeals. the plaintiff asserts as undoubted legal propositions :

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1st. That the annual profits of a life-rent, created during a previous marriage, but accruing during the second, and a claim for a sum of money which originated during the first, but remained unpaid during the second marriage, appertains to the second community

Under Art. 1272 of our Code there can be no question that the obligation for 840 livres and the rent reserved to the donors Joseph Pilon and his wife, Scholastique Neveu, became assets of the community, this article stating that all movable property, and rents, revenues, interest and arrears of whatsoever nature they may be, belong to the community.

This article is not new law, but the re-enactment of Art. 220 of Coutume de Paris, from which it is derived. See Pothier, Traité de la Communauté ([11]) ; Denizart, Communauté ([12]).

These authorities above quoted enunciate the unquestionable principles of our law respecting the property which falls into the community, and over which the husband has an absolute and unlimited control ; the arrears of rent accrued during the community, either that existing under the first marriage of Scholastique Neveu and Joseph Pilon, or under the second community of the said Scholastique Neveu, with her second husband, Jean Baptiste Lacombe, were chattels belonging, by law, to the community.

The same rules apply to the obligation of the 17th of February, 1811, for 840 livres which was transferred to Pierre Lalonde, on the 21st of January, 1870. This obligation was granted by the debtor to the widow after the dissolution of the first community. Whether the cause was a claim of this community or not makes no difference, as Pothier says : We consider only the thing due without any regard to its origin or to the cause from which it is derived. It is impossible -to

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conceive under what rule of law the defendants in the Court below, could assert the proposition that the life rent represented the immovable property which was granted to Adélaide Pilon by the deed of donation.

This alienation was unquestionably the free act of the father and mother in favor of their common child.

The usufruct, which was first reserved, may be considered as a joint acquest, immovable or real estate, and, admitting even that it represents in any proportion the value of the property given, the fruits or revenues derived from such usufruct undoubtedly accrued to the community as they became due.

The second conversion took place by the abandon-ment of the usufruct, on the part of the father and mother to their child, in consideration of which the liferent was constituted by the donees in favor of the donors ; and it cannot be pretended for a moment, that the arrears of the life-rent do not fall into the com-munity.

The defendants alleged that two of the immovable’s, so given were propres (i. e., the separate and absolute property) of the wife, and the other two, joint acquests —What belonged to her absolutely, she had power to dispose of as she thought fit ; what belonged to the community the husband had absolute authority to con-vey.

It matters not whether they were propres or conquets, or what proportion of value any of these properties bore respectively, we have to deal only with chattels, which are part of the community ; which, as such, were under the control, and at the disposal of the husband, and which he validly assigned, with the consent and concurrence of his wife.

The next proposition is that the husband had power to dispose of such property absolutely, and the convey-anee of it, made by the husband jointly with his wife,

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to his grandson, is not made in fraud to a person interposed, but, if done to the prejudice of the wife, it gives rise only to a claim by her or her heirs for, compensation. See Art. 1292 0. C. (P. Q.) ; Arts. 225, 233 Coutume de Paris (Duplessis), 375 ; Pothier, Traite de la Communauté, 708, 715, 720.

These authorities leave no room for doubt as to the absolute right of the husband to execute a valid conveyance of any chattel, even to his presumptive heir, issue of a previous marriage. "Whether it be acquired during the community or previous, it equally appertains to the community and, as such is at the absolute disposal of the husband, leaving the wife after the dissolution of the community, or her heirs to urge any objection as to the disposal by him made of any effects of the community, and to claim compensation therefore.

My third proposition is : There is no restriction or exception to the right of the community over movable property, or to the authority and control of the husband. over it, by reason of the previous marriage of the wife.

There existed under our old laws several prohibitions and restrictions on the property possessed by a widow or widower who contracted a second marriage when there existed any children, issue of the first marriage. The most important of these prohibitions is contained in the edict of Francis II., 1560.

But all these prohibitions have been abrogated by the statute of 1801, which gave unlimited power to parties to dispose of their property in favor of whomsoever they please, without any restriction or limitation ([13]).

Then we have our own article of the Code 764 C. C. L. C.

Now, admitting for a moment that the prohibitions

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existing under the edict of Francis IT and the article 379 of the Coutume de Paris were still in force the edict could not be held to apply to the transfer of the 21st of January, 1870.

The prohibitions of the edict affect only what the consorts hold by a donation or liberality of their deceased husband or wife. This cannot be said to comprehend the property which was acquired during the community as his or her share, this not being given by the husband or wife, but acquired by law in virtue of marriage, and the prohibition applies only to direct gifts of property obtained from the liberality of a previous consort made to a consort in second marriage.

The only grounds, therefore, which the defendants could urge to impugn the transfer would be the Art. 279 of the Coutume de Paris (if it were still subsisting), which precludes the wife from giving any portion of the joint acquits of her first community to the prejudice of the children issue of the first marriage and this article would apply solely to the transfer of the 840 livres.

This is no more the law of the Province of Quebec and was not in existence at the date of the transfer in question, and cannot, therefore, be invoked by the defendants as applicable.

The Code was published and came in force on the 1st of August, 1866, and the transfer in question was made on the 21st of January, 1870.

Even under the old law and the prohibition of Art. 279 of the Coutume de Paris, it never was pretended that the issues and profits or the annual income of property of any of the consorts, were subject to the restrictions of the edict or of the Coutume.

See Bourjon Droit Commun ([14]) ; Lauriére, Coutume de Paris ([15]) ; Merlin, Repertoire ([16]).

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But there is another ground upon which the respondents must succeed in getting the judgment of the Superior Court in their favor affirmed, viz :—

The debtor or the party who consented to the obligation transferred is not competent to raise the question of the validity of the transfer,—such right is exclusively reserved to the wife and to her heirs.

According to the law of the Province of Quebec all rights, obligations, debts and claims, personal and real special or otherwise, devolve to the heir the nearest of kin in case of intestacy, or to the universal legatee in case of a devise by will. After the death of the defendant and original debtor, Antoine Charlebois, pending the suit, his wife continued the proceedings as his representative, but not as heir or representative of her mother and she no more than her husband could urge these grounds which were reserved to the heirs in such capacity. It is a violation of an elementary principle of our law which precludes anyone from setting up the rights of third parties to avoid their liabilities. Defendant had no title, interest, or capacity to urge. Merlin, Rep.([17]).

Unless she assumed the quality of heir of her mother which would make her irrevocably liable for all obligations and debts of the estate, she could not claim any right to the property transferred by her mother, or question the title. If she had assumed her heir ship, the plaintiff was entitled to contest it or to show that there existed a will which disposed of this claim. The principle that such claims arising from transfers of movable property, by parties who contracted second marriages, could be made only on assuming the title of heir, and, as such, was so universally acknowledged in France, before the cession of Canada that Bourjon in his work ([18]) says : The Courts universally held that it

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was only a. reservation made by law in favor of the heir and which he could not urge if he renounced the estate.

This rule should have its application in Canada with greater force after the statute of 1801 which removed all restrictions and limitations as to the disposal of pro-perty, even between husband and wife, whether propres, acquets or conquets. It cannot be doubted that Adelaide Pilon, the mother, could have disposed by will of all her share of the first community in favor of her second husband. If the defendant had claimed as heir of her mother, the plaintiff would have been entitled to set up the will and deny her quality ; not doing so, the defendant had no ground to repel the action of the plaintiff.

When we come to consider the reasons given by the Court for the reduction of one-half on the claim arising from the assignment of the arrears of rent accrued from the 21st January, 1844, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that it is the result of an oversight on the part of the learned judges, of the true principles which regulate such matters and to which their attention was not called

The judgment admits that the arrears of rent are the property of the second community, and are not subject to the reservations and restrictions contained in the Edict or in the Art. 279 of the Coutume. Under these circumstances, it is clear the respondents must succeed on their cross appeal, and the appellants' appeal be dismissed.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by FOURNIER, J. :

L'action en cette cause a été intentée par Pierre Lalonde contre Antoine Charlebois. Les demandeurs et défendeurs, décédés tous deux pendant l'instance, sont maintenant représentés, le demandeur Lalonde,

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par son épouse Albina Malette en qualité de tutrice des enfants issus de leur mariage, assistée d'Emery Brunet son second mari, en qualité de tuteur conjoint aux enfants du premier mariage de la dite Albina Malette. Le défendeur Charlebois est représenté par Adelaide Pilon, son épouse et les enfants issus de leur mariage, reprenant l'instance.

Par son action, le demandeur originaire Lalonde réclamait du défendeur Charlebois la somme de $5576. 06. Le jugement de la Cour Supérieure, à Montréal, en date du 9 novembre 1877 lui accorde celle de $5,143 20 Appel du jugement ayant été interjeté par le défendeur Charlebois, la Cour du Banc de la Reine réduisit cette condamnation de plus de moitié, savoir, à la somme de $2,101.77.

Trouvant cette condamnation encore trop élevée les représentants de Charlebois, dame Adélaïde Pilon et al ont interjeté appel à cette Cour. De leur côté les représentants de Pierre Lalonde, se croyant lésés par la réduction que la Cour du Banc de la Reine a faite de la somme qui leur avait été adjugée en premier lieu, se sont aussi portés appellants. Ainsi, nous avons en cette cause deux appels di même jugement, mais en réalité ils n'en forment qu'un seul pour les questions à décider, can les moyens invoqués par l'une des parties an soutien de son appel, sont les mêmes que ceux qu'elle oppose à l'appel de son adversaire, et vice versa

Les faits qui ont donné lieu au present' litige sont en résumé, comme suit :

[The learned judge then stated the facts of the case]

En appel les principales questions decides par le jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine sont :

Lo. Si l'erreur commise dais le transport di 21 novembre 1870, en indiquant le 7 novembre 1828, comme étant la date de l'acte créant la rente viagère transportée au lieu de celle du 16 novembre 1830 qui

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est la veritable date, peut être fatale à cotte partie de l'action réclamant les arrérages de cette rente

2o. Si l'obligation du 17 mars 1811 pour 840 frs on aucune partie de la rente viagère transportée à Lalonde, représentait des biens acquis pendant la première communauté, et si dans ce cas Scliolastique Neveu pouvaient transporter ces créances à Lalonde au préjudice de son enfant.

3. Si dans le cas où la dite obligation et les arrérages de rente ne représentaient pas des biens acquis pendant la première communauté, ils out pu former partie de la seconde, et s'ils pouvaient comme biens de cette dernière communauté être transportés aux enfants et petits-enfants de Lacombe par l'acte du 21 janvier 1870.

Quant à la première de ces questions, la rente dont ii s'agit étant la seule due par Charlebois elle se trouve par le transport et par la preuve suffisamment désignée et identifiée pour qu'il ne puisse y avoir aucune méprise à cet égard. L'indication d'une date erronée n'ayant dans le cas actuel cause aucun préjudice à l'intime elle ne saurait être admise comme un moyen de faire rejeter cette partie de la demande qui repose sur Te transport. Dans tous les cas c'est une de ces erreurs cléricales auxquelles les cours n'attachent aucune importance lorsqu'elles n'affectent pas la position des parties. Cette Cour étant sur ce point du même avis que la Cour du Banc de la Reine est comme l'a été cette dernière unanime à déclarer cette objection non fondée.

Les deux autres questions ont été considerers par Ta Cour du Bane de la Reine comme si intimement liées qu'elle ne les a pas séparées dans l'examen qu'elle en a fait

Le jugement a déclaré que le transport des arrérages de la rente viagère en date du 21 juin 1870 était nul pour moitié et a réduit d'autant cette partie de Ia réclamation des appelants Il a aussi déclaré nul le trans-

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port de la somme de 840 frs., égale à $140, montant de l'obligation de 841.

Les appelants prétendent qu'ayant réussi quant à cette obligation, sur le principe qu'elle n'avait pu faire partie de la seconde communauté, la (Jour aurait du pour la même raison les renvoyer non seulement d'une partie mais de la totality de la demande.

Leurs prétentions peuvent se resume comme suit :

1. Que par suite des prohibitions de l'édit des secondes noces et de l'article 279 Coutume de Paris les biens- meubles qui tombent dans une communauté ordinaire, ne peuvent pas entrer dans une seconde, lorsqu'il y a des enfants vivants d'un premier mariage, et ils en concluent quel’ obligation de $110 n'est pas comprise dans la communauté entre J. B. Lucombe et Scholastique Neveu.

Qu'une partie seulement des arrérages de la rente viagère, savoir : 1/5 comme représentant les biens propres de S. Neveu avaient Pu en faire partie, les autre représentant pour autant les conquêts de Ia première communauté n'ayant pu y entrer, le transport qui en avait été fait était nul.

Qu'indépendamment des prohibitions ci-dessus mentionnées, le dit transport du 21 novembre 1870 est en outre nul comme contraire aux articles 1260 et 1265 O.C., déclarant irrévocables les conventions matrimo-niales, et défendant d'y faire aucun changement après le mariage.

De leur côté, les intimés Brunet et al, prétendent au contraire

1. Qu'il n'y a aucune différence entre une première et une seconde communauté * qu'il n'y a aucune restriction ni exception aux droits de ]a communauté sur les biens-meubles, et aucune limite au pouvoir et à l'autorité du mani sur les biens de la communauté à raison d'un premier mariage.

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2. Que les restrictions et prohibitions de l'édit des secondes noces et de l'article 279 Coutume de Paris ont été abolies par l'effet du statut de 1301, au sujet de la faculté de tester et par l'article 764 C. C.

Ne différant d opinion d avec la Cour du Bane de la Reine que sur un seul point, cette Cour ne croit pas devoir entrer dans la considération détaillée de toutes les questions que présente cette cause. Elle se bornera en conséquence à exprimer son concours dans ceux des motifs du jugement qu'elle approuve, en limitant ses observations à la seule question sur laquelle ii y a divergence d'opinion.

En donnant gain de cause aux appelants Pilon et al quant à la totalité de l'obligation de 840 frs., dont moitié appartenait à Scholctslique Neveu, comme sa part dans cette somme qui était un conquêt de sa mère communauté, la Cour du Bane de la Reine donne par là sans restriction, son approbation à la première proposition des appelants, savoir, qu'aucune partie des biens-meubles provenant d'une première communauté ne peut tomber dans une seconde. Cette Cour ne saurait admettre cette proposition générale, qui, si elle était fondée, comporterait une prohibition absolue à la femme et au mari qui passent à de secondes noces de faire entrer en communauté aucune partie quelconque des biens de leur première communauté. Il est indubitable que l'édit des secondes noces et l'article 279 Coutume de Paris ont apporté des restrictions importantes aux donations et avantages que peut faire à son conjoint la personne qui passe à de secondes noces. Ces prohibitions sont : 10. Qu'une veuve ayant enfants d'un premier ou autre subséquent mariage ne pent, en se remariant donner à son mari directement ou indirecte ment par personnes interposées, plus que la part de l'un de ses enfants le moins prenant—20. Ni donner aucune partie des biens oui lui proviennent des libéralites

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de ses précédents maris avec lesquels elle a eu des enfants auxquels elle est tenue de réserver ces biens, —30. Ni aucunement disposer des conquêts faits avec ses précédents maris an préjudice des portions dont losenfanss des dits précédents mariages pouvaient hériter do leur mere.

La première de ces prohibitions n'a aucune application à cette cause car il n'a pas été fait donation do part d'enfant par Scholastique Neveu, à son second mari, J. Bte. Lacombe.

La 2ème interdisant à la femme le no mien donner do ce qui lui provient des libéralités do sos précédents maris et l'obligeant à los réserver pour ses enfants, s'applique à la moitié des 840 francs dont S Neveu est devenue propriétaire par la libéralité do son premier mari. Le transport étant de la somme do 840 frs doit en conséquence être déclaré nul pour la moitié, comme étant fait en contravention à cette prohibition. L'autre moitié lui appartenant par son droit do communauté pouvait, sons certaines restrictions expliquées ci-après, tomber dans la seconde communauté.

La 3ême, qui est une extension de l'édit, defend à la femme do rien donner do ses conquêts à ses seconds et autres subséquents maris an préjudice des enfants des précédents mariages. La jurisprudence, dit Pothier à ce sujet (No. 636, Mariage) est conforme à l'esprit do l'art. 279. Il faut cependant remarquer qu'il y a une différence considérable entre cette dernière prohibition et la seconde. Elle restreint, il est vrai la liberté de la femme à disposer do sos conquêts, mais elle no constitue pas sur cette espèce do biens une substitution légale comme celle établie par le second chef à l'égard des biens dont la femme qui se remarie a été avantagée par ses précédents maris. Mais cette défense do donner de ses conquets peut-elle être interprétée comme interdisant à la femme le droit do faire entrer dans une seconde communaute

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aucune partie do ses biens-mobiliers provenant d'une première? La Cour du Bane do la Reine semble avoir admis l'affirmative ; car en déclarant quo la moitié des 840 frs. appartemant à S. Neveu pour sa part dans le conquêt de la première communauté, n'avait Pu pour aucune partie quelconque être valablement transportée par Lacombe, c'était effectivement décider qu'aucune partie do cette somme n'avait Pu lui appartenir par son droit do communauté. C'est admettre la première proposition des appelants qu'aucuns biens d'une première communauté no peuvent tomber dans une seconde. C'est sur ce point seulement que part la divergence d'opinion entre cette cour et celle du Bane do la Reine. Au soutien de cette partie du jugement los appelants citent un arrêt du 4 mars 1694 rendu sur les conclusions du chancelier Daguesseau qui l'aurait ainsi décidé. Est-ce bien la question qui a été jugée ? La lecture do cet arrêt fait voir quo los appelants lui ont donné uno plus grande portée quo celle qu'il doit avoir. Cot arrêt a jugé quo le terme "conquêt," dans la dernière partie do l'art. 279, comprend le mobilier comme I’ immobilier acquis pendant la durée d'une communauté, lors qu'il s'agit do l'exécution de l'édit des secondes noces et do l'art. 279 do la Coutume do Paris concernant los donations et avantages prohibés. Cette doctrine est sans doute correcte ; mais elle n'a pas l'effet do prohiber la communauté légale dans le cas do secondes noces, ni par conséquent d'empêcher quo des biens-meubles provenant d'une première communauté no puissent entrer dans une seconde. Il no faut pas non plus perdre do vue quo dans le cas do cot arrêt, comme dans los autres quo l'on trouve sur le sujet, ii s'agissait toujours do donations et de libéralités faites contrairement à l'édit et à l'art. 279 et dont la réduction était demandée. Merlin an mot Noces, secondes, le dit positivement : L'interdiction no s'applique qu'aux actes de donation pure.

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Dans le cas actuel les appelants ne demandent pas la réduction d'une libéralité qui leur a cause du préjudice ; ce qu'ils demandent c'est la nullité absolue du transport des arrérages de rente et de la somme de 840 frs. sur le principe qu'aucuns biens-mobiliers d' une premiere communauté ne peuvent, sans violation de l'art. 279, entrer dans une seconde. Mais cet article, en défendant à la femme de disposer de ses conquêts an prejudice de ses enfants, la prive-t-elle du droit de contracter une communauté légale et la faculté d'y faire entrer une partie quelconque de ses biens-mobiliers lui est-elle aussi inter-dite ? Certainement non. Les autorités suivantes le prouvent en même temps qu'elles établissent que la seule restriction à cette communauté est que la femme n'y peut pas apporter plus que son mari, sans faire à celui-ci un avantage que la loi ne frappe pas de nullité absolue, mais qu'elle déclare seulement sujet à réduction, s'il en résulte un préjudice pour les enfants.

Pothier—Mariage, No 550 :

La communauté do biens qui est établie entre une veuve et son second mari, est une espèce de contrat de société, qui ne renferme aucun avantage au profit du second mari, lorsqu'iI a apporté autant que sa femme : mais lorsque l'apport est inégal et que la veuve a apporté plus que n'a apporté le second mari ; ainsi, si la femme a apporté 4,000 en communauté, et que le second mari n'en ait apporté que 1,000; cette inégalité forme au profit du second mari un avantage sujet à la réduction de l'édit. Cet avantage est do la moitié do ce quo la femme a apporté de plus que lui.

Pothier—Contrat de mariage No 551 :

Dans la communauté légale, qui a lieu lorsque les parties ne se sont pas expliquées sun la. communauté, ou lorsqu'il n'y a pas du tout de contrat do mariage si le mobilier de la femme qui est entré dans cette communauté légale, était beaucoup plus considérable que celui du second mari, cette inégalité serait-elle censée faire un avantage au profit du second mari, sujet à la reduction do l'Edit, de même que l'inégalité d'apport qui so trouve dans la communauté conventionnelle ? il est constant dans l'usage qu'il y est sujet, do même quo celui qui résulte do l'inégalité des apports dans le cas de la communauté conventionnelle.

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Rep. Merlin—Vo. Noces (secondes) :

XIV.—La stipulation de communauté de biens, lorsque les apports sont égaux, n'est pas un avantage, elle en est un lorsque les apports sont inégaux de la part du second mari ou de la seconde femme. L'avantage est de la moitié de ce que l'autre époux a apporte de plus. Ainsi, le partage égal de la communauté ne peut se faire qu'après avoir défalqué les apports de part et d'autre.

XV.—La communauté légale qui s'opère en vertu de la Coutume et sans contrat de mariage, devient aussi Un objet de reduction; Si le mobilier de la veuve est. plus considérable que celui du second époux, l'inégalité fait au profit de celui-ci un avantage comme linégalité des apports dans la communauté stipulée. Cet avantage est également sujet au retranchement, car quoique le second mari ne semble le tenir que de la loi qui a déterminé Ta communauté et lee biens qui la composent, cependant comme ii dépend des époux d'adopter ou non les dispositions de Ia Coutume à cet égard, et quills ne peuvent, l'adopter sans une convention tacite, c'est de cette convention, de ce consentement tacite de la femme et non de la loi, que le second époux est censé tenir immédiatement ces avantages. La veuve en ne se réservant pas ses propres, comme elle le pouvait, et en laissant • tomber à dessein dans la communauté ce qu'elle avait de plus en mobilier que son second mari, est censé lui avoir fait en cela le même avantage que celui qui est fait dans le cas d'une communauté conventionnelle, lorsque Ta femme y apporte plus que lui i et ii est également sujet à Ta reduction de l'édit. C'est dans ce sens qu'il faut entendre l'arrêt du 29 janvier 1658 qui a jugé, dit Denizart, " que Ia communauté établie par la Coutume entre conjoints par mariage, se trouvant excessive de Ia part de celui des deux conjoints qui s'est remarié, est un avantage indirect au profit de l'autre, sujet à Ia réduction en faveur des enfants du premier lit, et qu'après la réduction faite, le surplus de la communauté se doit partager entre ces enfants et le survivant des conjoints.

Merlin, p. 556, vol. 8 :

XIV. La stipulation de la communauté de biens, lorsque les apports sont égaux n'est pas un avantage ; elle en est un lorsque las apports sont inégaux de la part du second mari ou de la seconde femme. L'avantage est de Ta moitié de ce que l'autre époux a apporté de plus.

XV La communauté qui s'opère en vertu de la Coutume et sans contrat de mariage deviant aussi un sujet de réduction ; si le mobilier de la veuve est plus considérable que celui du second époux, l'inégalité fait au profit de celui-ci un avantage, comme l'inégalité des apports dans la communauté stipulée. Cet avantage est également sujet au retranchement

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Arrêts de Brillon. V. Avantage, p. 804 :

La communauté établie par la Coutume entre conjoints par '. Mariage, se trouvant excessive do la part de celui qui s'est remarié, est un avantage indirect au profit do l'autre, sujet à réduction en faveur des enfants du premier lit, suivant ledit des secondes noces. Serve, T. 2. 1 ch. 86, rapporte l'arrêt du 22 janvier 1658.

D'après les autorités citées, ii est évident qu'en l'absence d'un contrat de mariage ii y a en communauté de biens suivant la loi entre J. B. Lacombe et S. Neveu. Cette dernière était lors de son mariage créancière de l'obligation de 1811, et de la rente viagére. Ces créances, ou partie d'icelle, sont-elles tombées dans cette communauté ?

Quant à l'obligation de 840 francs, ii y a une distinction à faire. S. Neveu en était propriétaire pour une moitié comme sa part dans cette créance provenant de la première communauté. Cette moitié d'après les autorités citées est entrée dans la seconde communauté mais sujette à la condition d'être réduite au cas où elle constituerait un avantage an profit de son second mari. Quant à l'autre moitié, comme ii faut conclure d'après les faits de la cause que S. Neveu en était devenue propriétaire à titre de libéralité de la part de son premier mari, elle est restée en dehors de la communauté. Non-seulement la loi (le 2nd chef de l'édit,) lui faisait défense absolue den avantager son second mari, mais elle établit sun les biens qui lui proviennent de cette manière une substitution en faveur de ses enfants. Ainsi ii y a eu dans ce cas, substitution en faveur d'Adélofíde Pilon de cette moitié des 840 francs qui na pu entrer dans la communauté. A la mont de sa mère, donnant ouverture à cette substitution, elle est devenue propriétaire de cette somme que, d'après la loi, elle est censée tenir de son père et non de sa mère

L'autre moitié des 840 francs, c'est-à-dire 420 francs, étant entrée dans la 2^nd communauté, J.-Bte. Lacombe en a acquis une moitié par son droit de communauté,

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c'est-à-dire 210 francs égal à $35. Si l'entrée de cette somme dans la communauté excédait ce que Lacombe y avait apporté Adélaïde Pilon aurait pu en demander la réduction. Mais pour cela ii aurait fallu plaider et prouver quels avaient été les apports respectifs des conjoints et constater qu'il y avait eu de la part de S. Neveu un excédant sujét à réduction.

Rien de cela n'a été fait. Il n'a été ni allégué ni prouvé que S. Neveu ait fait des apports plus considérables que son second mari. D'après la preuve tons ses biens n'auraient consisté que dans les deux seuls articles en question en cette cause, la rente viagère et 840 francs. Il n'a été fait aucune preuve des apports du mari mais ii est assez facile de constater par le trans-port même dont Ta nullité est demandée que ceux qu'il a faits devaient être au moins égaux à ceux de sa femme. En effet, par cet acte ii transporte à Lalonde en outre de 840 francs et des arrérages do Ta rente de diverses autres sommes, savoir : 5,200 francs et tous les intérêts échus ; 300 francs de rente viagère à lui due personnellement en vertu d'un acte antérieur à son mariage avec S. Neveu, et tous les arrérages de cette rente. En l'absence d'une preuve positive constatant les apports, on no peut pas présumer qu'il y ait eu inégalité, seule condition qui aurait pu faire maintenir une demande pour cette moitié des 840 francs. Comme propriétaire par droit de communauté d'un quart des 840 francs, 1.-Bte. Lacombe pouvait en faire le transport à Lalonde sans tomber sous l'effet d'aucunes restrictions, pas plus sous celles do l'édit que sous celles du code, Pour ces motifs le jugement de la cour du Bane do Ta Reine devrait être reformé et un quart des 840 frs devrait être ajouté à. Ta somme dont Lacombe pouvait disposer.

Quant aux arrérages do Ta rente viagère, cette cour est d'opinion pour les raisons données par Sir A. A. Dorion, qu’ils sont entrés dans Ta seconde communauté.

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Les autorités sont d'accord à considérer que pendant le mariage tous les revenus, de quelques sources qu'ils proviennent tombent dans la communauté. Le second mari n'est pas considéré avantagé par le surplus dédevenus que sa femme apporte à la communauté.

Pothier, au No 552 :

Le second mari n'est censé avantagé que de ce que la femme a apporté de plus que lui en principal : ce que la femme apporte de plus en revenus, n'est pas réputé un avantage prohibé et réductible qu'elle fasse à son second mari; c'est pourquoi, si une femme qui a par exemple dix mille livres de revenus s'est marié à un homme qui n'en a pas la dixième partie, et a contracté avec lui communauté de biens, dans laquelle entreront ses revenus pendant tout le temps qu'elle durera.

Ricard decide qu'en ce cas, quoique le second mari profite des revenus de la femme, néanmoins, cette communauté nest point réputée Un avantage qui puisse être réductible suivant l'édit. Merlin, rep. vo., Secondes noces, dit précisément la même chose. On trouve dans les arrêts de Brillon, vo. Avantage, p. 305, qu'il a été jugé, au sujet d'une rente viagère remplaçant un conquêt, que cette jouissance, étant un droit qui s'éteint par la mort du mari, ne pouvait former l'objet d'une demande en indemnité 11 est clair d'après les autorités que les prohibitions de l'édit des secondes noces et de l'art. 279 ne s'appliquent pas aux arrérages de la rente en question.

Ainsi d'après les autorités citées le transport est valable pour la part qui appartenait à Lacombe dans les créances transportées, savoir : moitié des arrérages de la rente vignetta moitié de 420 frs, partie de l'obligation de 18 11 tombée dans Ia communauté. Il est nul pour partie comme contraire au second chef de l'édit des secondes noces pour te moitié de 840 frs, qui était une libéralité de son premier marl que S, Neveu était tenue de réserver à son enfant. Mais indépendamment de l'édit, ce transport est encore nul pour toute la part de

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S. Neveu dans les créances en question comme étant en contravention aux articles 1260 et 1265 Code Civil concernant l'irrévocabilité des conventions matrimo-niales et comme constituant un avantage indirect con-" ferré par la dite S. Neveu. Sur ce point qui forme le sujet de la troisième proposition des appelants, cette cour partageant l'opinion de Sir A A. Dorion, se borne à la citer comme une réponse complete aux arguments contraires de l'Intimé.

There remains, however, the prohibitions of articles 282 and 283 of the Custom of Paris (articles 1260, 1266 and 774 of the Civil Code) that after marriage, the marriage covenants cannot be altered, nor can the consorts confer any benefits by acts inter vivos upon each other, except by means of life insurances. In the face of these pro habitations Scholdstique Neveu could not transfer her share in the second community, nor in the life-rent or arrears thereof, which formed part of the second community, to her husband, for this would have been altering the conditions of their marriage, by conferring upon him a pecuniary advantage. She was equally forbidden from transferring them to any of his descendants, who in that case are, by law, considered as persons interposed to secure indirectly to the husband a benefit which cannot be conferred to him directly. (Civil Code 774).

It has been said that the above rules merely apply to gratuitous contracts and that the "transfer to Lalonde was made for a valuable consideration but the consideration mentioned in the deed that Lalonde should take charge of his own father and mother, the latter being the daughter of Lacombe, is one which was altogether for the advantage of Lacombe and his family • and in which the wife Scholastique Neveu had no interest whatsoever, since she was not bound by law to contribute to the maintenance of the children of her husband by a first marriage. (Civil Code, art. 1304).

Pour termini ii ne reste plus que quelques mots à dire sur les propositions des intimes. La premiere, savoir qu'il n'y a aucune différence entre une communauté ordinaire et une seconde, n'étant que la contrepartie de celle des appelants, la réponse se trouve déjà donnée par les autorités ci-dessus citées établissant quelles sont les restrictions apportées par la loi à une seconde communauté.

Il en est de même de leur pretention que l'autorité du

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mari est la même sur les biens d'une seconde communauté que sur ceux d'une première. La réponse se trouve dans la citation de l'opnnion de Sir A. A. Dorion, démontrant clairement que les articles 1265 et 774 Code Civil, ne reconnaissent pas au mari une autorité aussi étendue sur les biens de la communauté que les intimes le prétendent.

La dernière question d'après l'ordre ci-dessus indiqué et qui aurait dû être la première si elle devait être résolue en faveur des Intimes est celle de l'abolition des prohibitions de l'édit des secondes noces et de l'article 279 de la Coutume de Paris. L'Intimé prétend que ces restrictions ont été abolies d'abord par le statut de 1801 qui a introduit la liberté illimitée de tester puis ensuite par l'acte 764 C.C., auquel ii attribue un effet rétroactif.

Le statut de 1801 a sans doute proclamé la liberté illimitée de tester, et fait disparaître toutes les incapacités de recueillir des legs à l'exception de celle concernant les mains-mortes. Mais cette règle n'est pasétendue à la faculté de donner entrevis dans des cas où elle était interdite. La loi est restée ce qu'elle était à cet égard. Après la passation de ce statut, les biens d'une personne décédant ab intestat étaient encore sujets aux réserves coutumières et aux autres restrictions introduites par l'édit et l'article 279. Pour exercer la faculté introduite parle statut de 1801 et être affranchi de toutes restrictions existantes auparavant il fallait disposer de ses biens par testament. C'est ce que la cour du Bane de la Reine a décidé dans la cause de Quintín vs. Girard le premier mans 1858, ([19]). Ni ce précédent ni le statut ne peuvent avoir d'application au cas actuel, parce que la disposition dont il s'agit en cette cause a été faite par acte entrevis, savoir par le transport du 21 février 1870.

Quant à l'art. 764, Code Civil, il est bien vrai qu'il

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déclare " que les prohibitions et restrictions des donations par un futur conjoint dans le cas de secondes "noces n'ont plus lieu,"—mais cette déclaration peut-elle avoir un effet rétroactif et affecter des actes qui ont été accomplis avant sa promulgation ?. Non, car l'art. 2,613 déclare que la loi en force avant le Code régit les actes faits antérieurement à sa promulgation. Et d'ailleurs, c'est un principe bien reconnu que les droits des époux sont irrévocablement fixes par le mariage ; one c'est aux lois alors en force ou aux conventions matrimoniales des parties qu'il faut recourir pour les déterminer en ce qui concerne les droits acquis ([20]). Nul doute qu'à l'époque de leur mariage, J.-Bte. Lacombe et S. Neveu étaient soumis à toutes les prohibitions ci-dessus mentionnées de l'édit et de l'art. 279. Les droits alors acquis entre eux doivent être régis par ces lois. Mais en doit-il être de même des réserves faites en faveur des enfants * peut-on les considérer comme des droits acquis avant le décès de leur mère ? Les auteurs déclarent qu'ils n'ont encore qu'une expectative qui ne peut So réaliser que dans le cas où ils lui survivront ([21]). Lorsque la loi leur accordant conditionnellement ces réserves est ensuite changée comme elle l'a été dans ce cas par lar 764 C.C., le conjoint auquel ces restrictions étaient imposées est-il par là même rendu capable d'en disposer ?

Il est généralement admis que les lois concernant la capacité des personnes prennent leur effet à dater do leur promulgation et n'ont point d'effet rétroactif ([22]). Mais ce principe ne saurait avoir d'application à cette cause. Que S. Neveu ait été on non lors du transport du 21 février 1870 rendue par l'art. 764, capable do disposer de ses biens par acte entrevis sans égard aux

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restrictions do l'édit et de l'art. 279, c'est une question quo les faits de cette cause ne permettent pas aux Intimes de soulever ici. En serait-il autrement s'il s'agissait d'une disposition que S. Neveu aurait faite a d autres qu'à son mari ? On pourrait probablement alors se demander si ce n'est pas la loi en force le 21 février 1870 qui devrait être appliquée et non parcella en force lors de leur mariage. Cette question est toute différente de celle que soulève le transport dont ii s'agit en cette cause et la cour pour cette raison s'abstient d'exprimer aucune opinion à cet égard.

Quant à l'effet du transport sur cette cause on pourrait même admettre avec los Intimes l'abolition des restrictions do l'édit et de l'art. 279 sans quo le résultat leur fût plus favorable. En effet ces restrictions disparues, ne reste-t-il pas celles des art. 1260, 1265 et 774 auxquelles il est manifestement contraire ?

L'art. 764 permet bien aux conjoints dans le cas de secondes noces de s'avantager sans égards aux restrictions ci-devant existantes. Mais la faculté qu'il leur donne no pout être exercée qu'au moment où ils règlent leurs conventions matrimoniales. C'est aux futurs conjoints qu'elle est donnée et non pas aux époux. Une fois le mariage conclu, los conjoints tombent sous l'effet de l'art. 1265 qui leur défend de faire aucun changement aux conventions matrimoniales. Ainsi bé transport doit, indépendamment de l'édit et do l'art. 279 être déclaré nub pour la part do Scholastique Neveu comme étant fait en contravention à l'art 1265

Pour toutes ces raisons cette cour est d'avis quo l'appel de Pilon et al, vs. Brunet et at, doit être renvoyé avec dépens en faveur des Intimes. Et quant à l'appel do Brunet et al vs. Pilon et al cette cour étant d'opinion qu'une partie de la somme de 840 francs, savoir un quart, est devenue la propriété do J. Bte. Lacombe, par son droit do communauté avec Scholastique Neveu, le transport

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qu'il en a fait aurait dû être maintenu pour autant, $35.00.

Le jugement de la cour du Banc de la Reine doit en conséquence être modifié, en ajoutant au montant de lacondamnation la somme de $35.00 ce qui porte à la somme de $2136.77 le montant pour lequel ii y a jugement, sans modification de la condamnation aux dépens prononcée par la cour du Banc de la Reine.

Appeal dismissed with costs, and on cross-appeal judgment varied with costs of such cross-appeal.

Solicitors for appellants : Duhamel, Pagnuelo & Rainville.

Solicitors for respondents : R. & L. Laflamme.