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R. v. Squires, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 323, 2002 SCC 82

 

Eric Squires                                                                                                      Appellant

 

v.

 

Her Majesty The Queen                                                                               Respondent

 

Indexed as:  R. v. Squires

 

Neutral citation:  2002 SCC 82.

 

File No.:  29060.

 

2002:  December 12.

 

Present:  Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

 

on appeal from the court of appeal for newfoundland and labrador

 

Criminal law — Charge to jury— Reasonable doubt — Accused convicted of first degree murder — Charge to jury giving rise to reasonable likelihood that jury misapprehended correct standard of proof.

 

Cases Cited

 

Applied:  R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320; referred to:  R. v. W. (D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742.


APPEAL from a judgment of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (2002), 209 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 99, 626 A.P.R. 99, [2002] N.J. No. 23 (QL), 2002 NFCA 4, dismissing the accused’s appeal from his conviction for first degree murder.  Appeal allowed and new trial ordered.

 

Derek Hogan, for the appellant.

 

Kathleen Healey, for the respondent.

 

The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by

 

1                                   Iacobucci J. — This is an appeal as of right.  The major issue on appeal is the adequacy of the trial judge’s charge to the jury on reasonable doubt.  On this issue, we agree, substantially for the reasons of O’Neill J.A., dissenting in the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal ((2002), 209 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 99), that the trial judge, who had the benefit of the Court’s reasons in R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, erred in his charge to the jury.  We agree with O’Neill J.A. that the charge, when read as a whole, gives rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

 

2                                   Since the matter is going back for a  new trial, it is not necessary to deal with R. v. W. (D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, and post‑offence conduct issues.  Accordingly, we would allow the appeal, set aside  the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and order a new trial.

 

 


Judgment accordingly.

 

Solicitor for the appellant:  Derek Hogan, St. John’s.

 

Solicitors for the respondent:  The Department of Justice, St. John’s.

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